Review of: Irmgard Männlein-Robert, Longin – Philologe und Philosoph – Eine Interpretation der erhaltenen Zeugnisse, Dissertation University of Würzburg winter semester 1999/2000, Vol. 143 of the series: Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, published by K.G. Saur, Munich / Leipzig 2001.
Reviewed by: Thorwald C. Franke, Frankfurt am Main / Germany, February 2021. Translated to English 14 July 2026.
[Please note: The German version of this review has meanwhile been published in printed form as an appendix to my book Kritische Geschichte ...]
The work on Longinus published in print by Irmgard Männlein-Robert in 2001 is her doctoral thesis, which was supervised by Michael Erler at the University of Würzburg, one of the most insightful and knowledgeable Plato scholars of our time. This work also benefited from a collaboration with Luc Brisson, a highly renowned French scholar of Plato. Since then, Männlein-Robert has distinguished herself with further publications on Plato and Platonism and has been promoted to professor.
Männlein-Robert’s work is a classic philological commentary. Across just under 650 pages of text, the various fragments of Longinus that have survived are systematically compiled and extensively annotated. 2,636 footnotes have been included. In addition, there is a 150-page apparatus comprising several indices of passages, authors and subjects, as well as an extensive bibliography. This is not just any publication on Longinus; it is, without question, the current standard work on Longinus. Malcolm Heath and Heinz-Günther Nesselrath have, however, identified some areas for improvement in their reviews; see those reviews.
The work was produced a few years before Harold Tarrant presented his translation of Proclus’s commentary on the Timaeus, accompanied by extensive commentary, in 2006. Proclus’s work contains the most important fragments relating to Longinus. It remains unclear why Männlein-Robert received no mention in Tarrant’s work.
This review examines the present work from the perspective of the Atlantis question. All in all, around 70 of the approximately 650 pages of Männlein-Robert’s work deal directly or indirectly with Plato’s account of primeval Athens and Atlantis in the Timaeus-Critias, which amounts to around 10%.
Technical note: Greek words are rendered in Latin transcription and in italics without accents.
Cassius Longinus (ca. 212-272 AD) lived in the time of Neoplatonism, but is himself still classified as a Middle Platonist, as he preferred a more traditional, literal and ‘dryly’ rational interpretation of Plato. He rejected the quasi-religious and enthusiastic interpretations of Neoplatonism. Longinus was both known and notorious for his often pedantically literal approach to interpretation, which is why he acquired the – sometimes derisive – reputation of being not a philosopher but a philologist. The accounts preserved by the Neoplatonist Proclus must also be understood from this partly mocking perspective.
We have no explicit statement from Longinus on the question of the reality or fictional status of Plato’s Atlantis. However, indirect conclusions regarding Longinus’s opinion on Atlantis can be drawn from the extant fragments and their historical context.
Männlein-Robert presents the Greek text for each fragment. Unfortunately, no translation was provided to illustrate her interpretation of the text. Although the Greek text is followed in each case by a detailed discussion of the passage, this sometimes reads like shadow-boxing against a translation that was never provided. One can sometimes only guess how Männlein-Robert would have preferred to translate the passage in question. This criticism is shared by Malcolm Heath: “The method of presentation is flawed. Männlein-Robert prints the Greek text of the fragments but does not translate them”.
Particularly problematic in relation to the Atlantis question is the treatment of the Greek word mythos. This is all too often translated lightly as the modern word ‘myth’. Männlein-Robert summarily explains the word mythos in Plato as a ‘purely fantastical story’ (“rein phantastische Geschichte”, p. 487). Such a simplistic categorisation is, unfortunately, completely unacceptable. The Platonic Myths are far too diverse for that. One need only consider that the first mention of the spherical shape of the Earth is also found in such a mythos. Furthermore, the word mythos had different meanings at different times. Plato understood mythos to mean something different from Plutarch, whom Männlein-Robert refers to in this context, and Plutarch in turn understood it to mean something different from the Neoplatonists. One might also surmise that Longinus distanced himself from the Neoplatonists on this issue, as on others. It is, therefore, complicated. Furthermore, the Atlantis tradition in Plato is said to be a logos rather than a mythos. It really is very complicated.
However, we must give credit to Männlein-Robert for the fact that, with her distinction between mythos and plastheis mythos in Plato, she at least argues in a far more nuanced manner than the vast majority of academic Plato scholars. The correct interpretation of the Platonic Myths is a subject in its own right, one at which most fail, and such an interpretation would scarcely have been feasible within the scope of the present work. Where one cannot expect miracles, however, one might have expected some restraint.
Although some of Longinus’ fragments refer to the proem of the Timaeus and even directly to the preview of the Atlantis story contained therein, they do not help to resolve the question of Longinus’ stance on the Atlantis issue, because they refer only to mere words and do not address the content. As far as can be seen, they are correctly reproduced and discussed by Männlein-Robert.
Among these neutral fragments is, for example, Longinus’s observation that Plato skilfully expresses the word ‘old’ in three different ways in connection with Critias’s age (Fragment 50, pp. 448 ff.). Or Longinus’s critique of Plato’s criticism of poets: if poets are unable to depict the ideal state well because they do not know it, then the same must apply to the participants in the dialogue (Fragment 52, pp. 458 ff.). Timaeus 21d4-7 already belongs to the Atlantis story: ‘Certainly the greatest (megistes) … feat …’ (German original: “Gewiss die größte (megistes) ... Heldentat ...”). Fragment 57 refers to this, in which Longinus dwells on the word megistes. Finally, it is handed down to us that Longinus omitted the brought forward preview of the Atlantis story at the beginning of the Timaeus in his commentaries on the Timaeus (Fragment 55, pp. 492 ff.). It is presumed that he did so only in his oral commentaries, for written commentaries are also available for this part of the Timaeus.
In Fragment 56 (pp. 54 ff.; 495 ff.), the discussion turns to Amynander, who plays a minor role in the chain of transmission of the Atlantis story from Solon to Critias, the participant in the dialogue (Timaeus 21bc), and thus to the content of the Atlantis story. Proclus writes about Longinus (In Timaeum 1, 90; translation by Tarrant 2006): “At this point once again the dedicated observers of detailed diction [Longinus] point out to their devotees that, when Plato praises the poetry of Solon, he is safely attributing the praise to an amateur [idiotes] and suiting the tastes of others, but not speaking his mind or his reasoning.” – The view that Plato puts words into Amynander’s mouth sounds very much like an invention. However, it should be noted that Proclus, who also believes that Plato put the praise of Solon’s poetry into Amynander’s mouth, fundamentally regards the Atlantis story as historical. How is this to be understood? One possibility is that a historical tradition is rendered in literary form. Another possibility would be that, whilst the history of the transmission of the Atlantis story is considered to be partly invented, the story itself is not. Thus, this fragment too provides no real resolution as to Longinus’s stance on the Atlantis question. Männlein-Robert unfortunately glosses over this issue without comment, because she does not even raise the question of whether Longinus might have taken Plato’s Atlantis seriously.
In Fragment 58 (pp. 510 ff.), Longinus does not criticise a linguistic phenomenon, but rather a substantive claim made by Plato regarding the Atlantis story: Plato asserts that it is the mixture of seasons in Athens that led to the emergence of particularly intelligent people there – even in primeval Athens. Longinus criticises the cause asserted by Plato and attempts to salvage Plato’s statement about the emergence of particularly intelligent people in Athens with a different explanation. In doing so, Longinus takes a statement pertaining to the story of primeval Athens and Atlantis seriously in terms of its content, and thus the Atlantis story itself. Männlein-Robert also states this fact quite openly, but at the same time attempts to interpret this taking of the Atlantis story seriously as a literary perspective:
“Longinus, however, does not take into account the fictional autonomy of the myth here, but attempts to provide an interpretation based on the wording of the text. Longinus, however, occupies a special position among text-oriented exegetes in that, whilst he, like them, takes the literary topos in the context of the Atlantis myth literally, he encounters insurmountable problems and is forced to acknowledge an aporia, primarily because of his intention to interpret this passage in harmony with the orthodox, now systematised Platonic doctrine of the soul.” (p. 64; German original: “Longin aber berücksichtigt hier nicht die fiktionale Eigengesetzlichkeit des Mythos, sondern versucht, eine auf dem Wortlaut des Textes basierende Interpretation zu geben. Longin jedoch nimmt unter den textorientierten Exegeten eine Sonderrolle ein, indem er zwar wie diese den literarischen Topos im Kontext des Atlantismythos wörtlich nimmt, vor allem aber aufgrund seiner Intention, diese Passage in Harmonie mit der orthodoxen, mittlerweile systematisierten platonischen Seelenlehre auszulegen, auf unüberwindliche Probleme stößt und eine Aporie konstatieren muss.”)
Yet this explanation does not hold up well. Firstly, simply taking the Atlantis story at face value is by far the more obvious interpretation than the view that Longinus interprets a story as an invented myth, yet nevertheless grapples with its specific statements as if it were not a myth. And Longinus does not merely criticise; he also attempts to salvage the truth of Plato’s statement by offering another possible reason why Plato is, after all, correct in his account of primeval Athens (and Atlantis). To explain this from a purely literary perspective requires some intellectual contortions. The balance of probability here tilts very clearly in the other direction, namely that Longinus did believe in the real historical substance of the story of primeval Athens and Atlantis. Of course, this is not a proof.
The central battleground for the correct interpretation of Longinus’s stance on the Atlantis question is Fragment 54 (pp. 83, 478 ff.; In Timaeus 1, 83). This concerns the bringing forward (parelaben) of a preview of the Atlantis story – which follows only later – as an interlude in the proem of the Timaeus. Longinus believed that this bringing forward of a preview was done solely for the readers’ entertainment, to lighten the dryness of the subsequent discourse of the Timaeus. Männlein-Robert correctly notes at the outset that there was a tradition of writing and interpreting proems which aimed at a psychagogia, a guidance of the soul for the purpose of entertainment. The question of the truth of the story presented for entertainment is not at issue here.
At this point, Männlein-Robert makes a fundamental error, which at first appears harmless but runs through her entire work and leads to false conclusions. She speaks only of an ‘insertion’ of the Atlantis story in the proem of the Timaeus, as if the Atlantis story itself were at issue, whereas Longinus is in fact speaking of something quite different, namely that Plato brings forward (parelaben) a preview of the Atlantis story set out later in the dialogue Critias. Longinus is concerned solely with this bringing forward of a preview in the Timaeus, not with the complete Atlantis story itself. This difference in perspective is of crucial importance.
Immediately following Longinus’s observation that the bringing forward (parelaben) of a preview of the Atlantis story in the proem of the Timaeus serves for entertainment, comes the crucial sentence. At this point, it is particularly regrettable that Männlein-Robert has not provided her own translation of the fragment. We present here the original and some translations for the reader’s consideration:
Greek:
Ὠριγένης
δὲ πεπλάσθαι
μὲν ἔλεγε τὸ
διήγημα
καὶ
τοσοῦτόν γε
συνεχώρει τοῖς
ἀμφὶ τὸν Νουμήνιον,
οὐ
δι᾽ ἡδονὴν δὲ
πεπλάσθαι
μεμηχανημένην
κατὰ
τὸν Λογγῖνον·
αἰτίαν
δὲ οὐ προσετίθει
τοῦ πλάσματος.
Translation Tarrant 2006:
"Origenes claimed that the narrative had been invented,
and to this extent he agreed with Numenius’ party,
but not that it had been invented
in the interests of artificial pleasure, like Longinus.
He didn’t add the reason for the invention."
Translation Thorwald C. Franke 2016 (German):
"Origenes aber sagte, dass die Darlegung erfunden sei,
und in diesem Punkt ging er konform mit dem Kreis um Numenios,
(dass) nicht die Bewirkung der Erbauung (des Lesers) gemäß Longinos
(der Grund) für die Erfindung ist:
Den Grund für die Erfindung nennt (Origenes) nicht."
Translation Thorwald C. Franke 2026 (English):
"Origenes, however, said that the depiction was invented,
and on this point he conformed with the circle around Numenius,
(that) not for the effecting of the entertainment (of the reader) according to Longinus
was it invented:
The reason for the invention (Origenes) does not present."
Here, Männlein-Robert believes she has identified an explicit statement by Longinus that the story of Atlantis is an invention: “From this passage, one can glean the important indication that, apart from Origenes and ‘those associated with Numenius’, Longinus too had judged the dihegema [depiction, i.e. the story of Atlantis] to be a plasma [made-up (story), i.e. invention]” (p. 482; German original: “Dieser Passage kann der wichtige Hinweis entnommen werden, dass außer Origenes und ‘denen um Numenios’ auch Longin das dihegema [Darlegung, d.h. die Atlantisgeschichte] als plasma [Erbildung, d.h. Erfindung] beurteilt hatte”).
Yet Männlein-Robert is mistaken. Whilst it would be grammatically possible to include Longinus in this sentence amongst those who interpret the Atlantis story as an invention (albeit for different reasons), the sentence structure does not necessitate this. One can also interpret this sentence to mean that Origenes and the others are merely discussing the purpose claimed by Longinus from the perspective of the Atlantis story being an invention, without Longinus sharing this perspective. This reading not only presents itself as the direct and natural interpretation, but is also almost inevitably suggested by the context, as the following points show:
It is abundantly clear that Longinus on the one hand, and Origenes and the others on the other, had two completely different perspectives, and that Longinus must not be placed in the same category as Origenes and the others. Yet Männlein-Robert does precisely this: “As can be seen from the rejection of Longinus’s explanation, Origenes must therefore introduce a further and indeed decisive differentiation within the concept of plasma or plattein, although he and Longinus evidently presuppose the non-reality of the story.” (p. 485; German original: “Wie an der Ablehnung von Longins Erklärung zu ersehen ist, muss also Origenes innerhalb des Begriffs plasma bzw. plattein eine weitere und zwar entscheidende Differenzierung ansetzen, obgleich er und Longin offenbar die Nicht-Wirklichkeit der Erzählung voraussetzen.”) This strange splitting of a category (plasma) into two subcategories that remain undefined, for the purpose of incorporating Longinus into this category, exists only in Männlein-Robert’s interpretation. Proclus himself does not attest to such a subdivision, although one might have expected him to. Proclus’s silence could have provided grounds for a critical re-examination of the thesis. This categorical error will reappear in the concluding argument below.
Incidentally, Tarrant’s translation is flawed. It is, after all, very bold to translate kata ton as ‘like’. And it is wrong to lose sight of those references that provide semantic emphasis: the close connection between ‘not’ and ‘entertainment’, or between ‘effecting of the entertainment’ and ‘according to Longinus’. Not even the de, which in the men-de structure distinguishes the sentence from the statement regarding Longinus’s opinion in the preceding sentence, has been translated. It is truly unfortunate that Männlein-Robert has not provided her own translation.
Following her interpretation of the central fragment 54, Männlein-Robert attempts to gather additional arguments to support the view that Longinus interpreted the Atlantis story as an invention. To this end, she has inserted a separate chapter on the ‘Tradition of the Interpretations of the Truth-Reference of Plato’s Atlantis Story’. (German original: “Tradition der Interpretationen des Wahrheitsbezuges von Platons Atlantiserzählung”)
Even before the additional chapter, immediately following the assertion that the sentence in question allegedly shows explicitly that Longinus, too, regarded the Atlantis story as an invention, footnote 347 (p. 482) appears. It states tersely: “Taylor, Commentary 50.” This refers to Alfred E. Taylor’s commentary on the Timaeus, where it is stated succinctly on p. 50: “From Proclus’ account it appears that Origenes and Numenius, as well as the great critic Longinus, regarded the story itself as a pure fiction.”
What looks like a supporting footnote turns out to be completely lacking in substance. For, firstly, Taylor merely says “it appears”, which is very vague, and secondly, Taylor provides not a single argument as to why he sees it that way. The footnote therefore conveys, at most, the information that Alfred E. Taylor also saw it that way. But that is merely a note on the history of science, not evidence. Incidentally, one could also have cited the renowned Swedish philologist Gunnar Rudberg, who made this claim just as without any argument, albeit much earlier than Taylor (pp. 20, 35 (English) / pp. 13, 26 (Swedish))
With regard to the views of Crantor (in Proclus) and Posidonius (in Strabo 2.3.6), Männlein-Robert correctly notes that these authors essentially advocated the existence of Atlantis (p. 483). Regarding the passage in Strabo 2.3.6, it is once again painfully apparent that Männlein-Robert has not provided her own translation, as this passage too is interpreted differently by various authors. Theophrastus, the disciple and successor of Aristotle, who likewise interpreted Atlantis as a historical event, unfortunately appears in Männlein-Robert’s work only in a footnote (350). This follows a certain tradition, as Pierre Vidal-Naquet also mentioned Theophrastus only in a footnote (Vidal-Naquet (2006) pp. 46 ff. and footnote 72 (German) or p. 53 and footnote 15 (French)). For a detailed discussion of Theophrastus and Plato’s Atlantis, see Franke (2012) pp. 131-133; Franke (2016) pp. 31-33. Männlein-Robert further notes that Numenius, Origenes Platonicus and Porphyry regarded Atlantis as invention (p. 484). That is correct.
At this point, it should have been noted that many earlier authors apparently advocated a more literal interpretation and thus the reality of Atlantis, whilst many later authors, e.g. Pythagorean enthusiasts and some Neoplatonists, wished to see only symbolism and demonic struggles in the story of Atlantis. The question should have been raised as to why Longinus, of all people, should have represented the views of the Neoplatonic enthusiasts on the Atlantis question, when he was otherwise known for favouring a literal interpretation? In particular, Männlein-Robert did not overlook Longinus’s rejection of the first Atlantis sceptic known to us by name, namely Numenius: “Longinus’s judgement of Numenius appears to be predominantly negative and dismissive” (p. 89; German original: “Das Urteil Longins über Numenios scheint überwiegend negativ und ablehnend zu sein”). The fact that Longinus judged the Atlantis sceptic No. 1 “predominantly negative and dismissive” could have raised questions.
Incidentally, Männlein-Robert makes no mention whatsoever of the thesis – still unchallenged and widely accepted in the academic literature on Plato’s Atlantis at the time of this work’s publication – that Strabo 2.3.6 allegedly contains an explicit statement by Aristotle against the existence of Plato’s Atlantis. In fact, she should have mentioned such a widespread thesis at this point and explained her own position on it. Yet Männlein-Robert simply remains silent on the matter, as if this thesis did not exist. See Franke (2012) pp. 55-57: ‘The strange handling of Strabo 2.3.6’. We suspect that Männlein-Robert had also thought further ahead on this issue than others.
Männlein-Robert suggests that, following Posidonius’s cautious endorsement of the existence of Atlantis, many scholars simply adopted his view. However, there were also dissenting voices that interpreted the Atlantis story as a narrative by the ‘poet’ Plato. This view presumably originated in the New Academy, according to Männlein-Robert. This view first becomes apparent in Plutarch (483 ff.; also p. 88): “With his interpretation of the Atlantis story as a pure myth inserted by Plato, Longinus likewise aligns with an originally Academic tradition, which first becomes apparent in Plutarch, who places Plato’s Atlantis story on the same level as Homer’s Iliad.” (German original: “Mit seiner Auslegung der Atlantisgeschichte als eines von Platon eingelegten reinen Mythos stimmt Longin gleichfalls mit einer ursprünglich akademischen Tradition überein, die zum ersten Mal bei Plutarch greifbar wird, der die Atlantiserzählung Platons auf der gleichen Stufe wie Homers Ilias ansiedelt”)
Yet several objections must be raised here:
Hermias is also classified as an Atlantis sceptic (pp. 84, 484): Hermias “rejects uninspired rhetoric that aims only at superficial entertainment.” (German original: “lehnt eine nicht inspirierte Rhetorik ab, die nur auf oberflächliche Unterhaltung abziele.”) However, this is not sufficient to classify him as an Atlantis sceptic. A statement by Hermias has been preserved which strongly suggests that he regarded Plato’s Atlantis as a historical event (Hermias In Platonis Phaedrum, ad Phaedrum 274c; p. 253 Couvreur).
In the following passage from Proclus, Männlein-Robert claims to have discovered a clue suggesting that Longinus regarded the Atlantis story as an invention (In Timaeum 1, 83; translation by Tarrant 2006): “Longinus raises the difficulty of what the presentation of this narrative means for Plato. For it hasn’t been composed for the relaxation of the audience nor because he requires them to remember [mneme] it.” Männlein-Robert interprets the word mneme (memory) here as an allusion to Critias’s recollection of the Atlantis story, and she in turn interprets this as an indication that the Atlantis story was an invention. She concludes: This “may be regarded as evidence that he [Longinus] is familiar with this rhetorical topos, which points to a plasma as ‘fiction’ ” (p. 485; German original: Das “dürfte als Beweis dafür angesehen werden, dass er [Longinos] diesen rhetorischen Topos kennt, der auf ein Plasma als ‘Fiktion’ hinweist”).
Yet the word mneme cannot in any way be an allusion to Critias’s recollection here. This is an overinterpretation that is not supported by anything. There is no discernible connection here between, on the one hand, the consideration of a possible ‘recollection effect’ among readers of the Timaeus – arising later in the course of reading due to the brought forward preview of the Atlantis story – and, on the other hand, Critias’s recollection of the Atlantis story. Furthermore, Critias’s recollection is no indication that the Atlantis story is an invention. For, as Plato quite plausibly states, older people are particularly good at remembering what they experienced in childhood.
Footnote 363 relates to the sentence regarding a rhetorical topos [on mneme and Critias’s recollection, see above] as an indication that plasma is ‘fiction’. It refers to Christopher Gill: “Plato on Falsehood-not Fiction”, p. 63, note 65, and to Otto Immisch (no page number given).
In Gill, at the indicated passage, we find the assertion that ‘great detail’ regarding the chain of transmission, the distant past, and mythical content should be regarded as signs of fiction. Yet of these three points, at most the point concerning ‘great detail’ in relation to the tradition could be linked to Critias’s recollection, for this recollection is part of the tradition. Yet Critias’s recollection can hardly be interpreted as “great detail” in the tradition. To meet the criterion of “great detail”, it would either have to be a detail mentioned for the sake of accumulating details, not because it is necessary, or it would have to be a detail viewed with exaggerated microscopic scrutiny. Yet it is neither: alongside the written record, the act of recollection is the central process of any tradition. One might call the individual names, places and times of the tradition ‘details’, but not the act of recollection itself.
In Otto Immisch’s work, there are general observations on literary motifs and devices, and these range colourfully from Cicero to Byzantine writers. No specific page number is given. That does not fit at all.
So here we have yet another footnote that looks like a footnote with evidence but is not one. One could perhaps actually use this footnote to substantiate something, but not the point to which the footnote is attached.
It should be noted, merely for the sake of information: Gill seeks here to identify literary topoi – signs of fiction – at a time when these were far from having developed. Furthermore, the mythical aspects contained in the Atlantis story are anything but signs of fiction; rather, they are partly what Plato himself believed, and partly typical peripheral and accompanying myths, such as the founding myth of a city, as also exists for very real cities. See on this Görgemanns (2000) p. 408. Furthermore, it must be assumed that, contrary to Gill’s view, the Atlantis story was primarily transmitted in written form, and that the oral tradition is possibly merely a literary device to introduce a real story into a fictional dialogue.
It is also striking that Männlein-Robert writes ‘fiction’ and Christopher Gill writes ‘mythical’ in simple quotation marks at the aforementioned point. It is not entirely clear how to interpret this. Is a ‘fiction’ something other than a fiction? And what exactly is the difference between ‘mythical’ and mythical? Especially since the meaning of the word myth in Plato, Plutarch, Longinus and Proclus remains unclear anyway.
Christopher Gill is generally a very poor source on which to base an academic thesis. Not least because Gill is constantly changing his mind. Of course, Gill does so again here, and indeed in the very same article, immediately (!) after the passage that Männlein-Robert cited as evidence in footnote 363. Gill writes: “This is a suggestion I have made elsewhere; ... Although I do not wish to disown this view entirely, or to deny the suggestive role of the Atlantis story in the history of Greek forms of narrative, I would like to mark some reservations from the line of thought just summarized. ... ... Part of the validation offered for the noble lie (...) is that the events presented are taken to be true”. (p. 63 ff.)
In short: Footnote 363 refers to a passage that is immediately relativised. This is, of course, particularly unfortunate. Christopher Gill tends here to side with Diskin Clay’s view: “Plato fabricated the myth of Atlantis with such art that it has virtually gone unrecognized as a fiction” (p. 8). In other words: it is acknowledged that the alleged signs of fiction and their supposed recognisability are a major problem.
Männlein-Robert writes of Longinus’s method of psychagogia that it is “often generally associated with the intention of poetry or myth” (p. 485; German original: “oft als Intention von Dichtung oder Mythos generell konnotiert”). The obvious question here is: what does “often” mean? In any case, “often” does not mean “always”. This significantly weakens the argument.
Furthermore: What do poetry and myth mean? Is a work of poetry always an invention? Can true events not also be treated poetically? And was that not even common practice back then? And the recurring question: What is a myth? For Proclus, for example, the myth of Atlantis was also reality.
Männlein-Robert concludes: “Thus, the terms psychagogein and plasma, referred to by Proclus and attributed to Longinus, also fit seamlessly into the rhetorical context employed by Longinus for explanation.” (p. 486; German original: “So fügen sich auch die bei Proklos referierten, Longin zugeschriebenen Begrifflichkeiten psychagogein und plasma reibungslos in den von Longin zur Erklärung herangezogenen rhetorischen Kontext ein.”) At this point, Männlein-Robert believes she has successfully pieced together all the puzzle pieces. We must disagree with this.
Männlein-Robert returns once more to the following sentence in Proclus (In Timaeum 1, 83; translation by Tarrant 2006): “Longinus raises the difficulty of what the presentation of this narrative means for Plato. For it hasn’t been composed for the relaxation of the audience nor because he requires them to remember it [pepoietai ten mneme].” Translated literally into English, this Greek phrase means “to make memory”. Männlein-Robert suspects that the verb poiein (to make) alludes to its other meaning in Greek, namely ‘making poetry’, and thus to the poetry-making and ultimately, of course, the invention of the Atlantis story.
However, the text contains no such suggestion. As mentioned, it concerns a consideration of a possible ‘re-remembering’ effect that might occur later in the course of reading among the readers of the Timaeus due to the brought forward preview of the Atlantis story, and not the invention of the memory of the complete Atlantis story. The one has nothing to do with the other.
But even if there was a connection: the word for ‘making poetry’ (poiein) does not automatically mean ‘to invent’ in Greek, certainly not in Plato. Only a word like plasma is unambiguously to be understood as an invention.
Männlein-Robert seeks to draw a parallel between the views of Longinus on the one hand and those of Macrobius on the other, who, in his work on Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis (I II 6), defines various degrees of truthfulness in stories of the fabula genre (p. 486). The Latin fabula is the translation of the Greek mythos. It is entirely possible that there is a parallel here, especially as the debate concerning more or less probable mythoi has been ongoing since Plato at the latest.
However, there is a problem. Plato wrote that the Atlantis tradition is not a mythos, but a logos. It is therefore highly questionable whether Macrobius classified the Atlantis story as a mythos or fabula. Furthermore, the fabulae described by Macrobius are, at higher levels, to be understood as increasingly less fictional and increasingly more real. And then there is the fact that, elsewhere in the same work, Macrobius adopts Plato’s cyclical view of history with repeated local catastrophes, from which Egypt is spared: ‘Egypt (however), as Plato acknowledges in the Timaeus, has certainly never been harmed by an excess of moisture or heat, which is why infinite thousands of years can be read solely in the monuments and books of the Egyptians.’ (In Somnium Scipionis II X 14) Macrobius thus accepted Egypt as a source of ancient knowledge and used the Atlantis story in the Timaeus as evidence. How likely is it, then, that Macrobius regarded the Atlantis story as an invention?
This turns Männlein-Robert’s argument into an argument against her own thesis. For if there really were parallels between Macrobius and Longinus, then perhaps Longinus too accepted Egypt as a source of ancient knowledge and Plato’s Timaeus as evidence of this?
Männlein-Robert argues that by classifying the Atlantis story in the Timaeus as a plasma intended for entertainment, the story’s ‘quasi-historical apparatus of authentication’ – which is mainly contained in the Timaeus – would in particular be exposed (p. 488). Such “authentications” were already referred to on p. 482 in footnote 376: here, Männlein-Robert recounts the narrative of the currently prevailing interpretation of Atlantis, namely that Critias asserts the truth of the Atlantis story with conspicuous zeal.
Yet many such assertions of truth are not that at all. Demonstrating this, however, goes beyond the scope of this review. In any case, this is not an ‘apparatus of authentication’, but a literary account of the history of the tradition. Furthermore, we must once again point out that Longinus was not concerned with the invention of the Atlantis story, but with the question of what purpose the bringing forward of the preview of the Atlantis story serves. The question of the ‘authentication’ of a fictional story has nothing to do with the question of bringing forward a preview of that story. Furthermore, significant parts of the ‘authentication apparatus’ are only presented in the later dialogue Critias.
Männlein-Robert interprets the statement by the dialogue participant Critias – that as a child he read Solon’s writings on Atlantis with pleasure (Timaeus 26b) – as a possible hint at the ‘entertainment’ that Longinus wishes to see in the brought forward preview of the Atlantis story in the Timaeus. Männlein-Robert sees something similar in Plato’s Politicus myth: this is explicitly described as a mythos, and “the entertaining effect on children is also explicitly stated” (p. 489; Politicus 268de; German original: “auch die vergnügliche Wirkung auf Kinder wird explizit formuliert.”)
Here, too, the presumed connection between Critias’s pleasure at having read Solon’s papers as a child and the alleged purpose of the brought forward preview of the Atlantis story – namely, entertainment – is highly far-fetched. In particular, however, the interpretation of the Politicus myth is incorrect. The Politicus myth is indeed explicitly referred to as a mythos, yet the Atlantis tradition is just as explicitly referred to as logos, not as mythos. The assumption implicitly expressed by Männlein-Robert that the Atlantis story is also a mythos, merely not explicitly named as such, runs counter to the facts.
Above all, however, the interpretation of the reference to paidia (joke, childishness) in the Politicus myth is incorrect. It is not the Politicus myth as such that is a paidia, but the fact that a long Platonic Myth is recounted, even though only a small part of it is required for the debate in the dialogue. This is made clear in the dialogue Politicus. Unfortunately, the reference to paidia is repeatedly misinterpreted in this respect.
As an aside, one might ask whether Longinus’s ‘entertainment’ (hedone) can be equated with this ‘childishness’ (paidia). ‘Entertainment’, ‘amusement’ in the elevated sense, can and should also be edifying; ‘childishness’, or a ‘joke’, however, is rather pointless.
At the end, Proclus once again mentions the two different categories of views on the Atlantis story, historia psile and mythos, and immediately afterwards summarises the arguments of these two categories in two sections (In Timaeum 1, 129). At least, that is the initial, natural impression one gets from this passage. As Männlein-Robert correctly observes, the arguments of the first group contain words that can be attributed to Longinus. But then Longinus would regard the Atlantis story as historia psile and not as mythos.
Männlein-Robert now argues that the two sections do not concern historia psile and mythos, but rather two sub-groups of mythos (pp. 489 ff.). In this way, Longinus is once again assigned to the category of mythos. The main argument is the characterisation of this group through a reference to Plato’s Phaedrus 229c-e, where Socrates refuses to demythologise myths. In Tarrant’s 2006 translation (In Timaeum 1, 129): “And some say that, firstly, the allegorical unveiling of these and similar tales [logoi] appears to Plato to be ‘for a hard-working person who is somewhat wide off the mark’ [vgl. Phaidros 229c-e]. Secondly, Plato’s communicative method is not of the same riddling sort as Pherecydes’, but gives clear teaching on very many points of doctrine – so one should not be forced into explaining it away when the man is proposing to teach us directly. Thirdly, that an allegorical unveiling of the story is not necessary in the present circumstances, since there is an acknowledged reason for the presentation of this narrative – the seduction of the listeners. And further, fourthly, if we explain away everything, then we shall suffer the same fate as those who waste time with tricky minutiae of Homer.”
Here, however, Männlein-Robert relies too heavily on the wording in Plato, where the term mythos is indeed used. In Proclus, however – and this is the point – the term used is logos, in the sense of any kind of exposition (here incorrectly translated by Tarrant as ‘tale’). Whilst it is true that the original passage refers to mythos, that is not what Proclus is expressing here: It is not a question of demythologisation in the strict sense, but simply a question of whether Plato’s texts require extensive interpretation or not, regardless of whether they are mythos or logos. The subsequent arguments immediately following also simply seek to convey that one should read and understand Plato’s words quite directly and that no extensive interpretation is required for this. There is no mention of mythos here whatsoever.
Added to this is the introduction, which announces two categories – historia psile and mythos – which is why it makes sense that two sections of arguments should then follow, which can be assigned precisely to these two categories.
It cannot be dismissed: here, the natural impression is also the correct one. The first section is to be assigned to the direct reading, the historia psile. And the second section – only the second section – is to be assigned to the mythos. Since Longinus can be assigned to the first group, this is a strong argument against the view that Longinus interpreted the Atlantis story as a fabrication.
Tarrant, too, is of the view that Crantor and Longinus are meant by this first section (Tarrant (2006) p. 224, footnote 551). Last but not least, one should bear in mind that a fairly literal reading of the Atlantis story – that is, a reading as a real historical tradition – fits Longinus perfectly, for Longinus was generally known for such a reading.
To begin with, Männlein-Robert correctly recognised that, when speaking about the climate in Athens, Longinus sounds as though he regards the story of Atlantis as true. Not everyone realises this, or at least not everyone articulates this insight clearly. Männlein-Robert did so. However, it was not tested whether this was in fact Longinus’s opinion, nor whether this interpretation might also hold water in other contexts.
Nor was this possibility examined in relation to the crucial sentence in fragment 54, and consequently no question was raised as to whether this sentence must necessarily be translated in such a way that Longinus regarded the Atlantis story as an invention. Instead, a surprisingly long series of additional arguments was subsequently compiled to support the interpretation once chosen; upon closer examination, they collapse one after the other.
Finally, Proclus’s categories regarding the various opinions on Atlantis were also misinterpreted. Where two categories, historia psile and mythos, are announced, there are allegedly only two sections on mythos, instead of one on historia psile and one on mythos.
The consistent pursuit of the initial thesis that Longinus regarded Plato’s Atlantis as an invention has led to very strange consequences. It is reminiscent of the overly complicated epicycles of the Ptolemaic world view: when a hypothesis leads to strange contortions, a critical review is called for. Sometimes a change of perspective, in the manner of the Copernican revolution, can lead to a significantly better hypothesis.
Männlein-Robert’s argument is entirely in line with the mainstream of current scholarship. Interpreting Longinus as an Atlantis sceptic has a long tradition: Gunnar Rudberg and Alfred E. Taylor already believed that Longinus regarded Plato’s Atlantis as an invention. When it comes to Atlantis, it is also perfectly common to tuck Theophrastus away in a footnote and quote Christopher Gill. And of course – because that is what ‘everyone’ says – Atlantis is regarded as an invention of Plato. As a myth. And a work of poetry. Männlein-Robert just has thought these basic assumptions through to their logical conclusion.
But that is precisely the reason for her failure: thinking things through to their logical conclusion. For Männlein-Robert observed more closely than others. And she thought further than others. And she encountered difficulties that others would not have seen. In particular, the long series of additional arguments testifies to the fact that Männlein-Robert was aware that her argumentation required further substantiation. However, as Männlein-Robert did not question the basic assumptions, she was bound to fail.
Yet it is not a pointless, merely erroneous failure. The strange conclusions Männlein-Robert arrived at make it abundantly clear that something is fundamentally wrong here. It is the basic assumptions that must be questioned! That is the insight that emerges from Männlein-Robert’s failure. It is therefore a helpful failure, of the kind that genuine science – and Männlein-Robert’s dissertation is undoubtedly genuine science – must repeatedly produce before it can move on to new perspectives.
Heath (2002): Malcolm Heath, Review of: Irmgard Männlein-Robert, Longin – Philologe und Philosoph – Eine Interpretation der erhaltenen Zeugnisse, 2002, in: Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2002.03.18.
https://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2002/2002.03.18/
Nesselrath (2003): Heinz-Günther Nesselrath, Review of: Irmgard Männlein-Robert, Longin – Philologe und Philosoph – Eine Interpretation der erhaltenen Zeugnisse, 2001, in: Classical Review No. 53 (2003) pp. 323-326.
https://www.academia.edu/30781262/
Clay (1999/2000): Diskin Clay, The Invention of Atlantis: The Anatomy of a Fiction, with an introduction by Gary M. Gurtler SJ, in: John J. Cleary / Gary M. Gurtler SJ (Hrsg.), Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. XV (1999), Brill, Leiden/Bosten/Köln 2000; pp. ix-xi, 1-21.
Franke (2012): Thorwald C. Franke, Aristotle and Atlantis – What did the philosopher really think about Plato’s island empire?, published by Books on Demand, Norderstedt 2012. First German edition was 2010.
Franke (2016): Thorwald C. Franke, Kritische Geschichte der Meinungen und Hypothesen zu Platons Atlantis – von der Antike über das Mittelalter bis zur Moderne, Verlag BoD, Norderstedt 2016.
Gill (1993): Christopher Gill, Plato on Falsehood – not Fiction, in: Christopher Gill / T.P. Wiseman (eds.), Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World, University of Exeter Press, Exeter 1993; pp. 38-87.
Görgemanns (2000): Herwig Görgemanns, Wahrheit und Fiktion in Platons Atlantis-Erzählung, in: Hermes Nr. 128 (2000) pp. 405-420.
Rudberg (1917/2012): Gunnar Rudberg, Atlantis och Syrakusai – En Studie till Platons Senare Politiska Skrifter, in: Eranos No. 17 (1917) pp. 1-80 with map. First English edition: Atlantis and Syracuse – Did Plato’s experiences on Sicily inspire the legend?, edited by Thorwald C. Franke, translated by Cecelia Murphy, published by BoD, Norderstedt 2012.
Tarrant (2006): Harold Tarrant, Proclus – Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Vol. 1., edited and translated by Harold Tarrant, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York 2006. First published in print format 2007.
Taylor (1928): Alfred E. Taylor, A commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1928.
Vidal-Naquet (2006): Pierre Vidal-Naquet, L’Atlantide – Petite histoire d’un mythe platonicien, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2005. First German edition: Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Atlantis – Geschichte eines Traums, published by C. H. Beck, München 2006.
In footnote 349 on p. 482 and footnote 375 on p. 488, Männlein-Robert refers to the interpretation of the Atlantis story by her supervisor, Michael Erler, and to the intradialogical statements regarding the redaction of the Atlantis story. These are the two threads one would need to follow in order to arrive at a completely different interpretation of the Atlantis story. That, however, would go far beyond the scope of this doctoral thesis. We only wish to point this out.